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Theories of deliberative democracy maintain that outcomes of 
democratic deliberation are fairer than outcomes of mere aggregation of 
preferences. Theorists of impartial justice, especially Rawls and Sen, 
emphasize the role of deliberative processes for making just decisions. 
Democratic deliberation seems therefore to provide a model of 
impartial decision-making applicable in the real world. However, 
various types of cognitive and affective biases limit individual capacity 
to see things from others’ perspectives. In this paper, two strategies of 
enhancing impartiality in real world decision-making are discussed. The 
first involves decision-making processes which detach decision-makers 
from their particular interests, whereas the second aims to enhance the 
quality of democratic deliberation and empathetic reasoning. We 
conclude that new forms of democratic deliberation may be necessary if 
we hold on to the aspiration of making decisions which are both 
democratic (responsive) and impartial. 
 
1. Introduction 
Theories of deliberative democracy are based on the view that the outcomes 
of deliberation are fairer than the outcomes based on mere aggregation of 
preferences. Pure preference aggregation does not set qualifications on the 
justifications of political proposals, and therefore majority rule decision can 
violate minority’s vital interests and rights (see Beitz, 1989, pp. 75-77). At the 
same time, theorists of justice, e.g. John Rawls and Amartya Sen, emphasize 




argues that there is a link between the concepts of democracy and justice 
which “runs through ‘impartiality’, which they both manifest and promote.”  
Despite the shared commitment to impartiality, democracy and justice 
are clearly distinct concepts as theories of justice emphasize outcomes, and 
theories of democracy procedures (Goodin, 2004, p. 101). Responsiveness 
and accountability are essential properties of the democratic process, whereas 
justice as such does not necessarily require them. The quality of democratic 
decisions depends on the capacity of democratic processes to tackle, not only 
issues of justice, but also issues of ‘truth’, that is, the validity of assertoric 
sentences justifying a certain decision (Habermas, 1996, p. 153). Moreover, 
theories of deliberative democracy are not only concerned about the 
(epistemic and moral) quality of decisions but also about the legitimacy of 
authority. 
In this paper, we focus on theories that use impartiality as a heuristic 
device when defining just outcomes. We argue that theories of deliberative 
democracy also rely on the idea of impartiality. Further, we analyze the ways 
in which democratic deliberation can be expected to enhance impartial 
reasoning and what are the main obstacles of achieving this ideal. As pointed 
out by Estlund (2008), real world deliberation cannot mirror idealized 
processes of impartial reasoning but yet the quality of democratic deliberation 
seems to depend on the extent to which it can approximate these processes. 
The paper thus examines the idea of whether and what kind of democratic 
deliberation can have the instrumental value of promoting impartial justice. In 
this respect, we follow the views of ‘epistemic theorists’ of democracy (e.g. 
Estlund, 2008).  
The paper is organized as follows. We start with formal accounts of 
impartiality, and after that we look at how the idea of impartiality has been 
interpreted in theories of deliberative democracy. In the third section, we 
point out limitations of impartial reasoning in the realm of democratic politics. 
In this discussion, we refer to the growing empirical literature showing biases 
emerging in reasoning processes, especially to that of empathy bias. The 
fourth section focuses on the possibilities of democratic procedures to remedy 




2. Impartiality and deliberative democracy 
2.1. The idea of impartiality 
Following the reasoning of Adam Smith (1759), Immanuel Kant (1785) and 
John Stuart Mill (1861), a number of more recent scholars define the idea of 
justice or morality as if it would be a result of an impartial decision-making 
procedure (Harsanyi, 1953, 1955; Hare, 1963; Rawls, 1971; Scanlon, 1982, 
1998; Sen, 2009). In these theories, an imaginary and ideal decision-making 
situation is used as a justification for a certain view of justice.1 Probably the 
most well-known characterizations of impartial justice is provided in Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice where the idea of a veil of ignorance entails that people do not 
have any specific information concerning their own identity.2 In Rawls’s 
original position the veil of ignorance guarantees impartial decision making on 
the principles of justice. 
Impartiality has been given different formulations in the literature.3 The 
formal understandings of impartiality set limits on decision-making or 
reasoning about ethical principles rather than defines those ethical principles. 
Impartiality implies that the evaluation of different principles, norms or 
policies should be independent of the identity of the decision maker holding other 
things constant. As an example, consider three individuals i, j and h situated in 
a particular social position with particular values, ideologies, interests and 
preferences. Impartiality means that h’s relationship to i and j should not 
influence his or her judgment, e.g. whether h is a friend or a relative of i or j, 
or whether h = i or j. Impartiality is similar to the anonymity condition in   
social choice theory which states that a social preference ordering should not 
be influenced by the identities of individuals who hold certain preferences. In 
other words, individuals should be “entirely interchangeable” (Estlund 2008, 
73).   
It is apparent that this kind of a formal impartiality is not sufficient to 
make claims about more substantial issues of morality and justice. To give an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Communitarian or feminist ideas of justice emphasizing partial judgments represent 
2 Hare 1963, Harsanyi 1953, 1955, Barry 1989, 1995, Scanlon 1982, 1998 represent similar 
reasoning. 
3 It is worth pointing out that impartiality is not equivalent with neutrality which requires 




example, a procedure giving speeding tickets to drivers on a random basis 
would be impartial in the above sense but would not – according to our 
common understanding – produce fair outcomes. Peter Stone (2011, 78) 
formulates a more substantial principle of impartiality according to which 
goods ought to be allocated only according to claim strength, e.g. on the basis 
of merit or need. According to Stone, a random allocation fulfills impartiality 
only when claims are equal and when the goods are non-divisible. Apparently, 
Stone’s understanding of impartiality calls for reasoning processes where 
individual claims are weighed according to some generally acceptable criteria.   
In all interpretations, impartiality rules out a priori favoring of particular 
parties. In other words, impartiality requires unbiased evaluation of claims and 
outcomes from the perspective of each relevant individual. Impartial decision-
making should take into account all possible individuals, or at least those 
individuals that are relevant to the issue at hand (see e.g. Rosanvallon 2011, pp. 
88-89). If some relevant perspectives were neglected the evaluation would be 
biased towards those perspectives that are included. 4 Sen (2009) provides a 
model of impartial reasoning where the perspective of an impartial spectator is 
a key to truly universal or open impartiality. Regardless of whether impartial 
decision-maker is regarded as one of the contractual parties (Rawls, Scanlon) 
or as a single decision-maker (Sen), theories of impartial justice share a rather 
similar picture of a decision-maker. The ideal decision-maker is rational, 
makes choices based on reasons and is not motivated by envy or the 
willingness to harm others.5  
 
2.2. Impartiality in democratic deliberation 
In this section, we take a closer look at how processes of impartial reasoning 
and democratic deliberation are related. In Estlund’s (2008) terms, this section 
deals with the ‘aspirational’ level of theorizing where impartiality is regarded as 
something to be aimed for, at least when making collective decisions on 
particular types of issues. The quality of democratic deliberation is often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is obvious that the definition of the set of relevant individuals is a major ethical issue, 
but a further exploration of this issue falls beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 Rawls (1971, pp. 144-145) talks about mutually disinterested parties referring to the lack 




perceived to be dependent on the extent to which deliberative processes 
approximate certain standards set forth in theories of impartial justice. For 
example, Rawls’ (and Scanlon’s 1982, 1998) theories have been applied in the 
evaluation of the quality of arguments and outcomes of deliberative processes 
(e.g. Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Steenberger et al., 2003).  
In Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls enlarges his argument formulated in 
Theory of Justice to societies characterized by a plurality of religious, moral and 
political world views. In Political Liberalism, withholding information is no 
longer considered necessary, but impartiality is rather pursued through the use 
of public reason. The concept of public reason requires that people are open 
to others’ perspectives and ready to justify their own claims in terms 
acceptable to others.6 Public reason therefore requires that justifications refer 
to values that can be shared by the free and equal members of a well-ordered 
society. In order to know what kinds of justifications can be accepted by all, 
the issue should be considered from all (relevant) perspectives. Quoting Kant, 
to reason publicly is to “think from the standpoint of everyone else” (cited in 
Gaus, 1997, p. 209).  
It is noteworthy that the concept of public reason does not imply 
agreement on best reasons – it is sufficient that there is a shared 
understanding of what counts as reasonable (Rawls, 1999, p. 170). Public 
reason requires that deliberators are actually ready to seek for shared values 
and justify their claims based on these values. Rawls’ concept of ‘overlapping 
consensus’ requires that citizens of a pluralist society adhere to public reason, 
i.e. laws and policies should be based on shared principles instead of citizens’ 
nonpublic comprehensive doctrines. In this respect, Rawls seems to require a 
consensus at the ‘meta’ level, that is, consensus on the criteria according to 
which different claims are judged (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006). 
Rawls (1993, p. 215) is rather specific about who should use public 
reason, i.e. citizens, members of political parties, candidates in their campaigns 
and other groups who support them, legislators and executive officials in their 
work, as well as the judiciary, the Supreme Court being Rawls’s prime 
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example. Rawls also specifies the types of issues which should belong to the 
realm of public reason that is, constitutional essentials and questions of basic 
justice. This suggests that the realm of public reason is narrower than that of 
democratic decision-making. However, Rawls (1993, p. 215) considers it 
possible to enlarge the use of public reason to a larger variety of political 
issues.  
Rawls’ references to Supreme Court as a prime example of deliberative 
processes may be illustrative, but perhaps not very helpful when analyzing the 
prospects of impartial reasoning in democratic decision-making (see below). 
Moreover, Rawls is not very specific about the ways in which impartial 
decision-making could be responsive to citizens’ claims and preferences. In 
addition to providing models of communication and reasoning, the concept 
of deliberative democracy entails a further condition that all bound (or 
perhaps all those affected) by a collective decision can either participate or be 
represented in deliberation preceding decision-making.7 This seems to lead the 
focus to formal institutions of representative democracy, such as parliaments 
where representatives of different viewpoints make binding collective 
decisions after exchanging and weighing arguments.  
Compared to Rawls, Habermas is much more specific when describing 
the relationship between citizens and decision-makers in representative 
democracies. He emphasizes the interaction between autonomous public 
spheres, i.e. the networks and associations of the civil society, and 
representative institutions where collectively binding decisions are made. 
Habermas points out the importance of deliberation in autonomous public 
spheres of civil society, for example, political discussions within associations 
and social movements as well as everyday political talk. According to 
Habermas, public deliberation in autonomous public spheres is a precondition 
for the legitimacy of democratic decisions. In the so-called two-track model of 
deliberative democracy, Habermas (1996, p. 371) stresses the interaction 
between public spheres and institutionalized deliberative will-formation in 
parliamentary forums. According to Habermas, the role of public spheres is to 
‘feed in’ and to ‘monitor’ the forums of collective decision-making.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Habermas’ two-track model of deliberative democracy is rooted in his 
theory of communicative action, which provides a more idealized model of 
communication among free and equal citizens.8 The central concepts of 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action, communicative rationality and 
the ideal speech situation, can be regarded as analytical tools which help to 
understand the operation of theoretical reason which aims to interpret and 
explain empirical reality and, perhaps more importantly, practical reason 
which is involved in moral reasoning (Rawls, 1999, p. 382). Habermas’ 
discourse ethics relies on the idea of impartiality. First, it requires that only the 
validity of claims should count in ideal speech situation instead of, for 
example, the identity or power resources of those who put forward the 
argument. Second, the validity of moral norms is defined through the 
universalization test which examines what is acceptable for all. The idea of 
universal acceptability of moral norms is parallel to the idea of public reason 
in Rawls’ theory.9 
Rawls’ (1971, 1993) idea of public reason seems to imply that there is a 
pre-existing consensus on the fundamental principles of the political order. 
Rawls (1993, p. 430) claims that Habermas’ account of public reasoning is 
incomplete because it does not specify the kinds of arguments ‘fed in’ to the 
process. Habermas emphasizes that universally acceptable principles should 
be determined in an ideal process of democratic deliberation which is the key 
to the discursive legitimation of public decisions. Habermas perceives 
democratic deliberation as an essentially intersubjective discursive process 
where arguments are exchanged and weighed. The publicity of discourse is a 
precondition to the emergence of communicative rationality and its validity 
criteria. 
In contrast, Scanlon (1998, pp. 393-394n5) seems to highlight internal 
reflection in moral reasoning rather than agreement reached through 
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9 Scanlon (1998, p. 393n5) highlights this similarity by pointing out Habermas’s claim that 




intersubjective communication.10 Democratic deliberation apparently requires 
both collective processes of arguing and individual processes of reflection or, 
as Robert Goodin (2000) calls it, ‘deliberation within’. Internal deliberation 
requires that people are both reflective over their own viewpoints and 
empathetic towards others’ positions. The ability to put oneself in others’ 
positions, or to empathize with other people, is a crucial aspect of 
‘deliberation within’. Even Habermas (1996, p. 162), who mostly emphasizes 
intersubjective aspects of deliberation, sees ‘ideal role-taking’ as a part of 
moral discourse. This term, originally introduced by G. H. Mead, means that 
people place themselves in others’ situations and perspectives. In Habermas’ 
discourse ethics, role-taking is used to track whether others have a 
generalizable attitude about the validity of a norm (Morrell, 2010, p. 79).  
While empathizing, as such, is an internal process, communication 
between people is needed in order to deliver information about others’ 
positions and points of view.  As a contrast to the Rawlsian idea of public 
reason which favors arguments appealing to shared values, many deliberative 
democrats hold the view that arguments which refer to individual or partial 
interests have an important role in the deliberative process. Mansbridge et al. 
(2010, pp. 72-73) argue that descriptions of others’ situations increase 
awareness of the relevant interests and viewpoints of affected parties. For 
example, if single parents with low income do not disclose their needs but 
remain silent, others may not become aware of their situation. This would 
compromise impartiality by excluding a relevant point of view from the moral 
discourse. Besides delivering information, self-interested arguments can also 
contribute to the justifications for certain points of view when the common 
good can be regarded as being composed of individual goods (Mansbridge et 
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outcomes which, following Scanlon, nobody could reasonably reject; people cannot 





3. The limitations of impartial reasoning 
As pointed out above, the ideas of democratic deliberation and impartiality are 
linked, because they both require a specific mode of reasoning where 
individuals judge claims made by all relevant parties, including themselves, by 
equal standards. We will next discuss how limitations in individual reasoning, 
especially empathy bias, affect democratic deliberation. Empathy seems to be 
a necessary element in the process of deliberating about justice. Generally 
speaking, empathy refers to the ability to put oneself in the other’s shoes; it is 
a relation between a subject who empathizes and a target who gives rise to 
empathy.  Despite recent contributions in this area (Morrell, 2010), the role of 
empathy is still neglected in empirical studies of deliberation and in the debate 
on how to enhance deliberation about justice in real world politics. Many 
theorists of deliberative democracy have given some role to empathy, but only 
few of them provide a plausible theory on how people begin to use empathy 
or ‘ideal role-taking’. In this respect, Morrell (2010) raises an important 
question of how people actually become willing and able to emphathize with 
others. 
There is not a shared definition of empathy in the literature. The term 
has been defined in a number of ways and various elements have been 
connected to empathy (e.g. Hoffman, 2000; Preston and de Waal, 2002; 
Walter, 2012). Further, sentiments of sympathy, compassion and empathetic 
concern are closely related to empathy both conceptually and empirically. 
Conceptually they are sometimes separated from empathy but other times 
seen as its synonyms or components. Empathy can be characterized as a 
process of gaining understanding about experiences and situations of others 
by imagination or internal simulation. For example, one can empathize with 
somebody who is seriously ill by trying to imagine how he or she feels and 
perhaps by going through similar feelings. The first part represents the 
cognitive element of empathy and the latter its affective element. Some writers 
emphasize the affective element of empathy, i.e. reproducing others’ 
sentiments, whereas others want to separate affective from cognitive empathy, 




Democratic deliberation and impartiality clearly seem to require the 
cognitive aspect of empathy, that is, understanding of others’ objective 
circumstances. Some writers (e.g. Krause, 2008, Morrell, 2010) argue that 
deliberation necessarily requires an affective component. Morrell (2010, pp. 
60-63) puts forward a “process model of empathy” (Davis, 1980) which 
emphasizes interaction between the cognitive and affective aspects of 
empathy. He claims that open-mindedness and sensitivity to others’ feelings 
are likely to be empirically related to the sense of reciprocity and commitment 
to deliberation. In other words, it is the affective part of empathy that 
motivates considerations of other people’s situations in the first place. If this 
is the case, affective components of empathy facilitate or can even be a 
precondition for the cognitive type of empathy. 
However, there are many reasons for being critical of the view that 
democratic deliberation requires the reproduction or interpretation of others’ 
sentiments. First, people can misunderstand others’ feelings as well as 
misrepresent their own feelings to enhance better outcomes for themselves. 
There is also the problem of morally ’wrong’ feelings, e.g. “the pain the racist 
feels in the face of anti-discrimination laws” (Krause, 2008, p. 166). Another 
concern with the emotional aspects of empathy is the ambiguous relationship 
between emotions and justice. As an example, consider two poor single 
parents living under same objective conditions. Despite the same 
circumstances, it is possible that one of them is deeply unhappy, whereas the 
other is content with her or his situation. If empathy is interpreted in terms of 
understanding the objective characteristics of others’ positions, the two 
parents can be considered to be in an equal situation and, therefore, deserving 
equal help or resources. However, if the idea of considering people’s emotions 
is taken seriously, the first parent might be seen to deserve more help or 
resources than the second.11  
The acknowledgement of the necessity of affective components of 
empathy helps to recognize potential sources of biases which can be 
problematic when impartiality is considered as the goal of democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 There is a discussion of whether the measure of justice should be objectively measurable 




deliberation. Social psychological literature provides a number of examples of 
empathy biases. People are more able and willing to empathize with people 
who are similar or close to them than with members of socially more distant 
out-groups (for references see Cikara et al., 2011). A single parent understands 
the circumstances of another single parent, a disabled person is familiar with 
the feelings of other disabled etc. Out-group members, on the other hand, are 
not as likely to give rise to empathy, and their suffering may even create 
positive sentiments (for references see Cikara et al., 2011). Bruneau et al. 
(2012b) show how compassion is lower for an out-group member who 
represents the other side in a conflict.  
The biases in the capacity to empathize are related to other well-known 
cognitive biases which play a role in deliberative processes. Morrell (2014, p. 
162) regards attribution, ingroup/outgroup and information processing biases 
as especially harmful if the aim of democratic deliberation is regarded to reach 
“democratically rational or reasonable decision”. Biases in people’s cognitive 
processes are linked to empathy biases, and thereby they hinder impartial 
reasoning. A typical example is the confirmation bias which means that 
information is searched for and interpreted in a way that confirm already held 
beliefs and opinions (e.g. Nickerson, 1998). Attribution bias refers to the 
tendency of holding oneself responsible for success but not for failure, 
whereas others are more likely to be held responsible for their failures but not 
for their success (e.g. Arkin et al, 1980). A paradigm example is the tendency 
of wealthy people to see that their success is due to hard work and, at the 
same time, perceive poor people as simply lazy. Poorer people are likely to 
think the opposite, that is, being wealthy or poor depends on luck or 
background and not on one’s own efforts. Morrell argues that references to 
public reason, suggested by Rawls, would not help in such situations because 
there is no shared understanding on the moral issue at hand.  
From this perspective, it becomes less self-evident that inclusive 
deliberation, as such, would be sufficient for such equal and systematic 
consideration of everybody’s positions. The problem of aforementioned 
biases seems to be related to the problem of internal exclusion, pointed out by 




equally in deliberative processes.12 Consequently, deliberative democracy as a 
political system seems to require a particular kind of civil society where people 
are exceptionally reflective to others’ perspectives. In such a system, people’s 
capacity to consider viewpoints of those who are in different positions is 
enhanced by active communication and interaction across different segments 
of society. Indeed, Sunstein’s (2009) concerns about group polarization in 
democratic societies are related to the view that when people interact only in 
enclaves of like-minded people, they lose their capacity to put themselves in 
positions different from their own.  
However, there may be some ways of expanding people’s capacity to 
empathize with out-group members. It has been suggested that empathy could 
be evoked through affective forms of communication such as rhetoric and 
story-telling. However, it should be remarked that individual capability to use 
rhetoric, stories and other types of communication varies. In this respect, 
these communication types do not provide an unmistakable remedy to the 
empathy bias. Goodin (2000) and Morrell (2010) endorse the idea that 
literature, films and arts could increase capacities to empathize with people 
who are different from oneself. Morrell argues further that there may be 
specific ways of enhancing empathy in democratic deliberation. He (2010, pp. 
106-113) suggests that deliberative processes could be supplemented with 
processes of affective role-taking where people are encouraged to pay 
attention to others’ feelings. Morrell refers to social psychological evidence 
that empathy can be stimulated. Indeed, there are findings which show that 
inducing empathy can enhance empathetic evaluations of out-groups.13 
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4. The role and limits of democratic institutions 
The preceding discussion shows that there are biases in individual reasoning 
which limit the prospects of equal consideration of all relevant claims. The 
problem is aggravated by the fact that democratic deliberation is based on the 
involvement of stakeholders themselves, not of impartial outsiders such as 
Rawlsian Supreme Court judges. Indeed, democratic deliberation necessarily 
entails a complex mix of self-interested and impartial reasoning. For example, 
elected representatives seem to have a dual role in democratic systems; they 
are expected both to promote particular interests and viewpoints of their 
constituents and to make impartial judgments of different claims put forward 
in the process of deliberation. The understanding of the dual role of the 
representatives helps to understand why impartiality seems to be so hard to 
come by in the realm of representative politics. For example, voters do not 
necessarily expect their representatives to be impassionate judges searching 
for a just outcome, but rather advocates of particular interests or ideologies.  
Although the importance of partisan politics and partial arguments is 
acknowledged by many deliberative democrats, it is also important that 
political actors are able and willing to make reasonable judgments at least 
when it comes to the issues related to the basic aspects of the social contract 
(cf. Rosanvallon, 2011, pp. 119-120). The design of institutions of 
representative democracy seems often to be deficient in this respect. Most 
importantly, the partisan characteristic of representative politics makes it hard 
for representatives to detach themselves from specific interests. The 
accountability of representatives undermines representatives’ capacity to 
engage in deliberation where different viewpoints are seriously considered. 
Constituents, especially when they are polarized, may constrain the scope of 
impartial reasoning within representative institutions.  
Overall, there seems to be two different strategies in enhancing impartial 
reasoning in public decision-making. The first strategy detaches decision-
making from particular interests, whereas the second aims to enhance the 
quality of democratic deliberation. Following the first strategy, impartiality can 
be seen as a normative principle guiding the operation of courts, institutions 




(2008) argue that impartiality can be enhanced in public administration 
through principles of administrative ethics. Moreover, there are specific 
agencies which are impartial in the sense that they are dedicated to a specific 
task and insulated from partisan interests. For example, Pierre Rosanvallon 
(2011, pp. 113-119) discusses central banks as examples of impartial 
institutions exercising significant power in policy-making. It is worth pointing 
out that judges, administrative institutions and independent agencies may 
promote impartiality in a relatively formal sense because they can only aim to 
apply certain pre-established norms and rules in an impartial manner, not to 
define the contents of these norms. Moreover, there is nothing democratic 
about these kinds of institutions since they do not entail systematic 
mechanisms of responsiveness or accountability (cf. Thompson, 1985). 
Authors inspired by Rawls have suggested ways of enhancing impartiality 
through institutional arrangements which disconnect democratic decision-
makers from their particular values and interests. Elster (1998) suggests 
institutional arrangements in the process of constitution-making which 
simulate the Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’. He (1998, p. 117) puts forward a 
procedure where constitutional changes would come into force after a long 
time lag, for example, after twenty years of ratification. According to Elster, 
this would help to overcome the influence of short-term partisan interests in 
constitution design. More generally, Vermeule (2007, pp. 31-33) discusses the 
idea of so-called veil rules which encourage decision-makers to consider a 
variety of possible positions and payoffs structures. Veil rules call for more 
reflective modes of decision-making which is likely to counteract different 
biases affecting individual decision-making. Vermeule argues further that veil 
rules can be translated into institutional design principles which are widely 
applied in constitution-making such as the generality, prospectivity and 
durability principles. 
Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, argue that biases in individual 
reasoning and empathy can be remedied through inclusive forums of 
deliberation where people are systematically exposed to others’ viewpoints 
and encouraged to take them into consideration. Mercier and Landemore 




deliberation on certain cognitive biases which undermine impartial reasoning. 
For example, they point out that confirmation bias can be alleviated by the 
requirement of justification and by exposure to alternative viewpoints 
(Mercier & Landemore, 2012, p. 253). It is notable that different modes of 
deliberation may be helpful for counteracting different types of biases. For 
example, while consensual forms of deliberation may be expected to 
encourage people to consider issues from everybody else’s perspectives, i.e. 
use empathy, more confrontational forms of deliberation may be needed to 
reveal and challenge cognitive biases. 
In the context of parliamentary democracies, institutional arrangements 
such as nonpublic committee work have been regarded as a way of severing 
party discipline and constituency constraints and promoting impartial 
reasoning among representatives (Elster, 1998; Chambers, 2004). Impartial 
reasoning can also be enhanced by delegating the task of deliberating to non-
accountable committees including experts and stakeholders or, more 
democratically, to non-accountable ‘citizen representatives’ in deliberative 
mini-publics (Warren, 2008). In deliberative mini-publics, lay citizens who 
represent different viewpoints deliberate on a specific issue. These forums 
entail some procedural features, such as balanced information briefing and 
impartial moderators, which can be expected to help to overcome biases in 
reasoning. There are also studies showing that organized citizen deliberation 
helps to increase deliberators’ understanding of viewpoints different from 
their own (for a review, see Setälä & Herne, 2014). Organized citizen 
deliberation could be helpful especially in fundamental issues such as 
constitution-making or in cases where elected representatives’ strong vested 
interests undermine their motivation to impartial reasoning. This applies, for 
example, to issues such as electoral reforms (see e.g. Thompson, 2008). 
Apparently, there are limits to the extent to which traditional 
representative institutions can even out certain types of biases, e.g. those 
based on gender, ethnicity and education. What may be even more worrying 
from the perspective of deliberative democracy is that social inequalities seem 
to play a role even in deliberative mini-publics. There is empirical evidence 




forums (e.g. Setälä et al., 2010). This suggests that social inequalities may be 
mirrored in deliberative processes even when particular efforts have been 
made to overcome patterns of internal exclusion.  
Indeed, it has been argued that measures enhancing social justice, e.g. 
opportunities through free universal education and egalitarian income 
distribution, should be perceived as a precondition for successful democratic 
deliberation (see e.g. Fraser, 1992; Young, 2000, pp. 34-5). Another possibility 
of responding to negative impacts of social inequalities would be to improve 
procedures of democratic deliberation. These improvements could involve 
measures that stimulate empathy among deliberators, as Morrell suggests, or 




In this paper, we have pointed out that both theorists of impartial justice and 
democratic deliberation require processes of weighing arguments by their 
merits only, not on the basis of partial considerations or specific interests. 
Following Estlund, impartiality can only be regarded as an aspirational goal 
which is yet worth aiming for especially on issues pertaining to basic rights 
and interests. We have also discussed certain limitations in people’s capacity of 
impartial reasoning, especially biases in capacity to empathize. Finally, we have 
pointed out how democratic deliberation can be expected to enhance 
impartial reasoning.  
As Räikkä (1998, p. 37) points out: “Often morally desirable 
arrangements are infeasible because injustices are so deeply entrenched”. 
When it comes to the relationship between impartial justice and democratic 
deliberation, there seems to be kind of ‘chicken egg’ problem. The tendency 
of social inequalities being mirrored rather than corrected in processes of 
deliberation seems to limit the possibilities of democratic deliberation to 
enhance impartial justice. Moreover, representative institutions are partisan in 
character which may reinforce rather than counteract biases in representatives’ 
reasoning. In Rawls’s theory, this problem is circumvented by limiting the 




Deliberative democrats are keen to develop practices and institutional designs 
enhancing more inclusive forms of public reasoning.  
Despite observed biases in individual reasoning and empathy, democratic 
deliberation seems to be the only feasible option if we hold on to the 
aspiration of making decisions which are both democratic (responsive) and 
impartial. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the effects of 
biases in reasoning can be alleviated by well-designed processes of democratic 
deliberation. The regularity of biases, the conditions under which they occur, 
and the ways in which they can be avoided are empirical problems which call 
for further studies. A thorough understanding of biases emerging in different 
decision-making contexts is needed in order to make more informed choices 
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